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Abstract
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) are one of the
few measures that were successfully realised on the international plane in the decadeslong pursuit of corporate accountability. For 20 years, the OECD Guidelines and their
non-judicial grievance mechanism, the National Contact Point (NCP), have been continuously resorted to by victims and advocates in holding businesses to account for various abuses and misbehaviours. Interestingly, NCP cases (specific instances) have only
steadily increased through the years despite the challenges, limitations and criticisms
that the mechanism has been confronted with. And more states continue to adhere to
the Guidelines, OECD members and non-members alike, and bind themselves to the
obligation of establishing an NCP within their territory. Such mechanism accordingly
remains relevant, valuable and indispensable. This article seeks to revisit and examine
the OECD Guidelines and the NCPs in light of the two United Nations (UN) pathways
initiated by the UN Human Rights Council: the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights (UNGP) and the elaboration of a potential treaty on business and
human rights (BHR). It will identify and evaluate three important features that make
the mechanism unique vis-à-vis other BHR mechanisms. The article will focus its analysis and discussion on how these features are able to or can meaningfully contribute to
the UN pathways, as well as how they could be harnessed to improve existing propositions and drafts leading to the desired legally binding instrument. It will also identify
some of the mechanism’s shortcomings, and understand some of the points made in
this regard. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations on how the mechanism
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could be improved and how these features could assist in shaping the future of corporate accountability.
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1

Introduction

The recent years have finally seen traction develop in the area of business and
human rights (BHR). A multitude of research, discussions and negotiations
culminated in the United Nations’ (UN) issuance of two significant resolutions: (1) UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution 17/4 (2011),1 endorsing
the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights (UNGP) annexed
in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s final report in UN
Document A/HRC/17/31,2 and (2) UN HRC Resolution 26/9 (2014), establishing “an open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises” which shall have the authority to
elaborate a business and human rights treaty.3 These resolutions have created two important pathways in the field. On one hand, the UNGP clarifies
state and business duties and responsibilities in respect of human rights, and
promotes access to remedies through existing grievance mechanisms. On the
other hand, a potential treaty seeks to identify existing gaps and codify a legally
binding instrument that shall regulate the activities of businesses in international human rights law.
While the aforementioned instruments are milestones that may signal the
international community’s better commitment for corporate accountability,
1 UNHRC Res 17/4 ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (6 July 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4.
2 UNCHR Res 17/31 ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie
(Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework)’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (UNGP).
3 UNHRC Res 26/9 ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (14 July 2014
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9.
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they do not provide the complete solution just yet. Support is needed for
these two instruments to materialise and operationalise. The UNGP articulates the need to utilise and strengthen existing mechanisms, and identifies
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) with
the National Contact Points (NCPs) as a concrete example of an established
grievance mechanism that could provide effective remedy. This is particularly
highlighted by the UNGP in its commentary where the OECD Guidelines are
identified as one of the international frameworks whose efforts on human
rights protection is aligned with the UNGP.4 In fact, one could easily identify,
upon a cursory reading of the relevant UNGP provisions in its second pillar
(on the corporate responsibility to respect), their resemblance, if not identicalness, with the provisions and commentaries in the general policies and human
rights chapters of the OECD Guidelines.5
UNHRC Resolution 26/9 provided broad brushstrokes that could consider
past and current promising experiences in the drafting of a potential BHR
treaty. And this may include the OECD Guidelines and the NCPs. The UN’s
Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Activities with Respect to Human Rights (OEIGWG), which
was established through Resolution 26/9, has submitted several drafts, the latest being the Third Revised Draft dated 17 August 2021.6 A cursory reading of
the Third Revised Draft would also easily indicate some similarities with both
the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines, albeit quite understandably, not in the
same level of similarity as between the latter two considering that the former is
still in the drafting stages. The apparent alignment and similarity of the OECD
Guidelines with the two UN BHR pathways is not a coincidence; the drafters
4 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
(United Nations 2011) pp. 27–28 (UNGP Commentary); UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions about the Guiding Principles for Business and
Human Rights (United Nations 2014) 46, annex II (noting that “[t]he 2011 edition [of the
OECD Guidelines] includes a chapter on human rights that is in alignment with the Guiding
Principles”); see also OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011 edn, OECD)
ch IV, para 36 (OECD Guidelines) (stating that the human rights chapter “draws upon the
United Nations Framework for Business and Human Rights ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
and is in line with the Guiding Principles for its Implementation”).
5 See UNGP (n 2) prins 11–24; OECD Guidelines, (n 4) chs II and IV.
6 UN Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group Chairmanship, ‘Third Revised Draft:
Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (UN OEIGWG, 17 August
2021) <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/
LBI3rdDRAFT.pdf> accessed 27 August 2021 (Third Revised Draft).
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recognise the OECD Guidelines’ contribution and value. And this necessarily
merits understanding the features that make the OECD Guidelines and their
own grievance mechanism compelling.
The OECD Guidelines became one of the rare measures that were successfully realised on the international plane in the decades-long pursuit of corporate accountability. For 20 years, the OECD Guidelines and the NCPs have
been continuously resorted to by victims and advocates in holding businesses
to account for various violations and misbehaviour. Interestingly, NCP cases,
or more technically, specific instances, have only steadily increased through
the years despite the challenges, limitations and criticisms that the mechanism has been confronted with.7 And as recently as 24 February 2021, another
(non-OECD member) state (Uruguay) has adhered to the OECD Guidelines,
rounding up the number of ‘adhering countries’ to 50: 37 OECD members and
13 non-members.8 Such mechanism accordingly remains relevant, valuable
and indispensable in the corporate accountability discourse.
This article seeks to revisit and examine the OECD Guidelines and the NCPs
in light of the two UN pathways. It will identify and evaluate three important
features that make the mechanism unique vis-à-vis other BHR mechanisms:
(1) its hybrid nature, whereby a non-binding international instrument results
in the establishment of a legally binding obligation upon states to establish a
state-based non-judicial mechanism, (2) its non-traditional nature of being a
mediation process; an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that seeks to
complement rather than compete with the long-established judicial process,
and (3) its innovative ability of producing cooperation and collaboration channels across the various NCPs and non-adhering countries. Part 2 of the article
will discuss the hybrid feature of the OECD Guidelines and the NCP system.
Part 3 will identify certain features that are either initiated by individual NCPs
or are undertaken by them on account of the mechanism’s flexibilities. For this
purpose, the article examines statements issued by NCPs in 236 complaints
spanning the themes, general principles, human rights and environment from
25 May 2011 to 31 March 2021. The article will focus its analysis and discussion

7 See OECD, ‘Database of Specific Instances’ <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/>
accessed 1 April 2021.
8 OECD, ‘Adherents’ (OECD 2021) <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD
-LEGAL-0307#backgroundInformation> accessed 2 April 2021. For the purpose of this article, the author will use ‘adhering country’ rather than ‘adhering state’, consistent with the
references made by the OECD and in the OECD Guidelines. See eg Decision of the Council
on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (adopted 27 June 2000, amended
25 May 2011) OECD/LEGAL/0307 (Decision of the OECD Council) preambular para 2.
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on how these features are able to or can meaningfully contribute to the UN
pathways, as well as how they could be harnessed to improve existing propositions leading to the desired legally binding instrument. It will also identify
some of the mechanism’s shortcomings, and understand the points made in
this regard. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations on how the mechanism could be improved and how these features could assist in shaping the
future of corporate accountability.
This article does not in any way present the OECD Guidelines as the best
example of a corporate accountability mechanism or as the answer to such a
complex problem. In the first place, doing so would be counterintuitive to the
ongoing efforts that further seek to concretise and strengthen corporate obligations and redress of grievances. Rather, it will invite readers to consider certain features that appear to be distinctive, practical and valuable, and which
may be a source of insight to either improving current mechanisms or designing new ones.
2

The Hybrid Feature

2.1
A Soft Instrument with a Corresponding Hard Obligation
It is undisputed that the OECD Guidelines were created as a set of recommendations composed of non-binding principles and standards.9 They were
intended to guide investors to undertake responsible business conduct in
their operations.10 Quite uniquely, the creation of a soft instrument led to the
obligation upon adhering countries to establish an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that shall operationalise and “further the effectiveness” of
the Guidelines.11 This came in the form of a state-based non-judicial grievance mechanism, the NCP, which victims can use to seek redress from corporations for their human rights, environmental and other abuses. Despite the
non-binding nature of the Guidelines, they resulted in the creation of a legal
obligation on the part of adhering states. This came in the Guidelines’ revision
in 1984 when the NCP was introduced, and more importantly, the Decision of
the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in
2000 (as amended in 2011), that adhering countries are legally obligated to

9		
10		
11		

OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 3 (Foreword).
ibid.
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I; OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 71.
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establish an NCP within their territory.12 Particularly, the Decision of the OECD
Council states that:
[a]dhering countries shall set up National Contact Points to further the
effectiveness of the Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities,
handling enquiries and contributing to the resolution of issues that arise
relating to the implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances,
taking account of the attached procedural guidance.13
While the adhering countries were not prepared to make the principles and
standards enshrined in the OECD Guidelines mandatory on TNCs within
their territory, they committed themselves, through an international legal
instrument referencing and executed in relation to the OECD Guidelines, to
the obligation of creating a non-judicial grievance mechanism that would
assist in resolving disputes arising as a result of corporate conduct. Although,
as a side note, and as discussed elsewhere including in the UNGP’s General
Principles and in Urbaser v Argentina, TNCs or foreign investors have certain
human rights obligations under international law.14 OECD decisions are legally
binding international instruments to the OECD members as well as to nonmembers who decide to adhere thereto.15 They are deemed to create the same
type of legal obligation as treaties.16
Despite implementing a set of guidelines rather than a binding set of
rules, the creation of the NCP paved the way to a new tool that victims, trade
unions and NGOs, among others, could use to seek responsibility on the part
of, or changes in the policies of, a TNC. And this has complemented and
12		
13		

14		
15		

16		

Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) para I(1), cited in OECD, Structures and Procedures of
National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2018)
p. 16; OECD Guidelines (supra note 4) p. 13.
Decision of the OECD Council (supra note 8) para I(1). The Decision further adds that
“[a]dhering countries shall make available human and financial resources to their
National Contact Points so that they can effectively fulfil their responsibilities, taking into
account internal budget priorities and practices.” ibid para I(4).
UNGP (n 2) gen prin para 4; UNGP commentary (n 4) p. 1; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio
de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic (Award)
(2016) ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26 [1195]–[1199] and [1205]–[1210].
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (adopted
14 December 1960, entered into force 30 September 1961) 888 UNTS 179 (OECD Convention) art 5(a); Nicola Bonucci, ‘The legal status of an OECD act and the procedure for
its adoption’ (OECD, 5–6 April 2004) <https://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond
-school/31691605.pdf> accessed 3 April 2021; OECD, ‘OECD Legal Instruments’ <https://
www.oecd.org/legal/legal-instruments.htm> accessed 3 April 2021.
ibid.
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supplemented other existing mechanisms, most notably, domestic courts.
The establishment of the NCP system in the manner discussed above presents
some creativity on the part of policymakers to bring the BHR discourse one
step closer to the right direction. In the context of the first UN pathway, the
OECD Guidelines’ alignment of their principles and standards with the UNGP
reinforced the value of the NCP system. The UNGP likewise benefits from the
NCP system as a ‘ready’ mechanism that it could recommend as fulfilling its
third pillar (access to remedy). Considering the UNGP’s encouragement to use
judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms to ensure corporate accountability, the legal setup and structure created by the OECD Guidelines could
also serve as a template for future grievance mechanisms especially when the
adhering parties are not yet fully committed to impose binding principles and
standards on legal persons. This legal design may not be as relevant to the second UN pathway as it is to the first, as the idea of the second pathway is already
to create a legally binding instrument. But it could nevertheless be considered
by the OEIGWG in designing a future BHR treaty. The NCP example may provide a halfway venue for states that may not be ready to fully commit to the
principles and standards enshrined in a BHR treaty (or perhaps conversely, the
empowerment of its judicial and state-based non-judicial mechanisms), but
that are nevertheless willing to consent, to a certain degree, to such legally
binding instrument. Depending on the negotiations and the direction that
the OEIGWG will ultimately take, it may be possible for the potential treaty to
be clustered into two parts. A state may possibly be given the opportunity to
consent to be bound by the treaty, with the agreement that certain significant
parts of the treaty will not take effect together with the rest per usual, but will
only do so at a specified or determinable future time. This presupposes that
the part of the treaty that is in ‘suspended motion’ is not something coverable
by a reservation, and that this is intended merely as a temporary leeway to
states that may be willing but not yet fully prepared to agree to all the terms of
the agreement. This may be a better accommodation for states that find themselves hesitating to consent to a potential BHR treaty, and might be more desirable than that state not agreeing to be bound by the treaty at all or postponing
doing so at an indefinite future time. As to which portion could be potentially
carved out as belonging to such cluster and as to whether this is even feasible
will need further consideration.
A Top-to-Bottom Approach in the Implementation of a State-Based
Mechanism
In terms of structure, although the source of the Guidelines and the obligation to establish a mechanism is international, the mechanism created is itself
2.2
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domestic by design. In the words of the OECD, this is a state-based mechanism that has been established as part of the government infrastructure, with
staffing and funding likewise provided by the government.17 Despite this, and
owing to its basis of creation being international, the NCPs do not act fully
independently of external (international) authority, as state-based mechanisms or government instrumentalities normally would.
The OECD provides varying levels of ‘support’ to NCPs through the Secretariat, the Council and the Investment Committee. Of the three, the Investment Committee is the body within the OECD that is directed to oversee and
monitor the NCPs to ensure the “effective functioning of the Guidelines”.18 Its
tasks include receiving the NCPs’ annual reports,19 providing clarification on
the OECD Guidelines as necessary,20 and submitting periodic reports to the
Council.21 Its other tasks and responsibilities are laid out in paragraph II of
the Decision of the OECD Council and in paragraph II of the Procedural Guidance covered by the Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines.22 It
does not, however, act as an appellate body to the NCPs.23 While NCPs have a
high level of flexibility, as will be discussed in the next part, it appears that the
NCP structure affords the OECD, an international body, significant influence
and role to play in ensuring the effective functioning not only of the OECD
Guidelines but more importantly, of the state-based NCPs. Whether the OECD
has taken advantage of its important position in the NCP structure is a matter
that needs a separate evaluation. Be that as it may, this feature is an area which,
when harnessed, could significantly improve the existing mechanism, and
which a future mechanism could likewise adopt and further enhance. Doing
so would also reinforce the NCPs’ core criteria and the factors for the effective
implementation of the Guidelines.24

17		

18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

OECD, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises’ (OECD, 2017) <http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/National
-Contact-Points-for-RBC-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf> accessed 25 March 2021 (OECD
FAQs); Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) para I(4).
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) para II(4) and annex para II(2); OECD Guidelines
(n 4) p. 77.
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I(D).
ibid, para II(4) and annex para II(2)(c).
ibid, para II(7).
ibid, para II and annex para II; OECD Guidelines (n 4) pp. 68–69 and 74–75.
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) para II(4); OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 88.
The core criteria include visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability. The
Decision of the OECD Council also provides that the implementation of the Guidelines
must be impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with Guideline principles and
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The NCP system also uses a horizontal approach25 in the sense of the
NCPs’ obligation to cooperate with other NCPs and non-adhering countries
as necessary, and to provide assistance by responding to enquiries made by
other NCPs regarding the OECD Guidelines. This will be discussed in part 4 of
the article.
3

Flexibilities of a Non-judicial Mechanism

The NCP was designed as a conciliation and mediation tool that would offer
the relevant parties an opportunity to address human rights, environmental
and other concerns identified in the Guidelines in a voluntary, consensual and
non-adversarial manner.26 The OECD Guidelines afford the NCP system a certain level of flexibility that may not be seen in a judicial proceeding on account
of certain technical or procedural constraints in the latter, or even in other
types of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The flexibilities available
to the NCP have in many instances, either led to accountability on the part of
TNCs, or the improvement in their policies and activities. This even includes
changes to how they deal with clients and those who they are in a ‘business
relationship’27 with, as in the case of their supply chain. In situations where no
responsibility was found, these flexibilities may have at least helped move corporate accountability to the right direction. This is because some (if not many)
TNCs will understand the seriousness of victims and advocates in seeking
accountability, and the possibility of a complaint being filed with an NCP may
serve as a potential deterrent to any future misbehaviour or adverse impact.
These flexibilities will be presented here in turn. It is necessary to bear in mind
at this point that flexibilities and margins of discretion will have both positive and negative attributes. The deficiencies of the NCPs have already been
addressed in other papers. Some of these deficiencies will also be discussed

25		
26		
27		

standards. Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex paras I and I(C); OECD Guidelines
(n 4) p. 79.
OECD, Structures and Procedures of National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2018) p. 14 (OECD Structures and Procedures).
OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 73.
See OECD Guidelines (n 4) 23, para 14 (stating that business relationship “includes relationships with business partners, entities in the supply chain and any other non-State or
State entities directly linked to its business operations, products or services”). The UNGP
mirrors this definition. See UNGP Commentary (n 4) p. 15 (stating that a business relationship is “understood to include relationships with business partners, entities in its value
chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations,
products or services”).
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here. However, the focus of the discussion here is to examine the flexibilities
provided by the OECD Guidelines through a positive lens, analyse how they are
effective and conversely, ineffective, and propose how they could be improved
considering the two UN pathways.
3.1
A Potential Favourable Outcome within a Shorter Timeframe
First, going through the NCP system can result in a favourable outcome within
a timeframe that is normally shorter than a judicial process. The Commentary
on the Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines (Commentary)
provides that NCPs must “strive to conclude the procedure within 12 months
from the receipt of the specific instance”.28 In the Complaint from WWF
International against SOCO International plc, which was filed on 7 October 2013
and concerned oil exploration activities by a UK TNC in the Virunga National
Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the NCP proceedings led to an
agreement between the parties on 11 June 2014.29 The proceedings were subsequently closed and a final statement was issued by the UK NCP on 5 July 2014,
about 10 months from the time the complaint was filed.30 The conclusion of
proceedings naturally varies from one specific instance to another. For example, in other cases that resulted in favourable outcomes, these ranged from
approximately 1.5 years,31 to 2.2 years32 and 2.5 years,33 and even to just slightly
over 4 years.34
Most of the aforementioned specific instances were decided beyond the
typical indicative timeframe of 12 months. And on this point, the Commentary
does acknowledge the need to extend the timeframe depending on the circumstances of each case. Be that as it may, the NCP process could nevertheless

28		
29		
30		
31		

32		
33		
34		

OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 87.
Complaint from WWF International against SOCO International plc (Final Statement)
National Contact Point of the UK (15 July 2014).
ibid.
Specific instance submitted to the Italian NCP on the 15th December 2017 by Chima Williams
& Associates (CWA) and Advocates for Community Alternatives (ACA), on behalf of Egbema
Voice of Freedom, versus ENI S.p.A. and ENI International BV (Final Statement) National
Contact Point of Italy (8 July 2019).
Teck & Quebrada Blanca Trade Union (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Chile
(7 February 2020).
Specific instance regarding Credit Suisse submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples
Switzerland (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Switzerland (16 October 2019).
Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive Development International on behalf of 681 Cambodian
families (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Australia (27 June 2018).
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provide a shorter timeframe relative to judicial proceedings35 and could
therefore provide, depending on the circumstances, a speedier and less costly
access to remedy to the victims as well as reduced court dockets in the process. Although, it must be stressed that the NCP system was meant to, and does
complement and supplement (rather than compete with) judicial and other
non-judicial grievance mechanisms in providing victims access to remedy.
Consistent with the UNGP’s recommendations, maintaining the NCP system
as a non-judicial grievance mechanism is therefore necessary, albeit requiring
improvement as discussed here and elsewhere. The potential BHR treaty could
also attempt to harmonise the judicial and the NCP systems so that victims
who find themselves availing of both processes, whether simultaneously (as in
the case of parallel legal proceedings which will be discussed further infra) or
subsequently, will be provided a more streamlined, less costly and overall less
burdensome experience as they navigate through the legal (and other) intricacies of these mechanisms. Article 7 of the Third Revised Draft has commenced
addressing this issue in broad terms.36 But this will have to be further teased
out to ensure that states parties would be able to provide more or less uniform
remedies to victims.
3.2
Independent Investigation
The NCP also has the ability to engage in independent fact-finding or investigatory activities. This has been clarified by the Commentary.37 Paragraph 39 of
the Commentary extended this fact-finding authority to complaints where the
harm or adverse impact occurred in a non-adhering country. The Commentary
did not elaborate on the extent to which fact-finding could be undertaken. But
it stated that this “could include contacting the management of the enterprise
in the home country, and, as appropriate, embassies and government officials
in the non-adhering country”.38 Investigations undertaken by NCPs have led to
different outcomes, ie some found the allegations to be substantiated in
35		

36		
37		
38		

See eg the Vedanta and Okpabi cases, where on jurisdictional grounds alone, the cases
took over three and roughly six years respectively to resolve. Lungowe & Others v Vedanta
Resources PLC & Konkola Copper Mines PLC [2019] UKSC 20; Okpabi & Others v Royal
Dutch Shell PLC and Another [2021] UKSC 3. See also Oguru, Efanga and Vereniging
Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Ltd ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:132 (The Hague Court of Appeal, 29 January 2021)
(where the case was finally decided on 29 January 2021 as it went up the judicial ladder,
commencing with the 30 January 2013 decision of the District Court).
Third Revised Draft (n 6) art 7.
OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 86.
ibid.
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varying degrees39 and some did not.40 In these cases, the ability of an NCP to
make its own independent investigation is significant in ensuring that complaints could prosper despite the initial insufficiency of information that could
substantiate the alleged violations. However, the extent to which fact-finding
can be undertaken may need further clarification and parameters in order that
NCPs may feel more comfortable undertaking them without hesitating that
they might be overstepping the bounds provided by the Guidelines. This could
potentially avoid a conservative approach to fact-finding, assuming that a conservative one might limit the information that NCPs could gather, and which
in turn could limit an NCP’s ability to better assess the complaint and properly
provide recommendations. A mechanism’s ability to investigate is not exactly
addressed by the Third Revised Draft. But it provides in Article 7.2 that states
parties “shall ensure that their domestic laws facilitate access to information,
including through international cooperation”.41 This obligation reinforces and
facilitates the NCP’s investigatory authority. The above statement is followed
by the phrase, “and enable courts to allow proceedings in appropriate cases”.42
While the first part creates a separate obligation from the second following
treaty interpretation, the inclusion of the second part in the same sentence
confuses rather than clarifies. It might prove helpful to reconsider the wording
of the second part, and likewise to include that not only courts but also nonjudicial mechanisms are enabled to allow proceedings as appropriate.
3.3
Initiating an Assessment Motu Proprio
NCPs are able to initiate or launch an assessment motu proprio. This was done,
for example, by the Danish NCP against its own Government’s Ministry of
Defence. In this case, the Danish NCP launched a specific instance against the
Ministry after it has become aware of reports alleging that Denmark’s inspection vessel, Lauge Koch, had been constructed using forced labour from North
Korea.43 The Danish NCP eventually found the Ministry of Defence not to be
compliant with the due diligence requirements of the OECD Guidelines. This
39		

40		
41		
42		
43		

See eg Specific instance on the Danish NCP’s own instigation: The due diligence process of the
Danish Ministry of Defence in regard to the contracting and building of the inspection vessel
Lauge Koch (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Denmark (6 September 2018);
Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights (LPHR) & G4S Plc (Final Statement) National
Contact Point of the United Kingdom (March 2015).
See eg Complaint from 3F against Greenpeas Enterprise ApS (Final Statement) National
Contact Point of Denmark (14 August 2014); Violations of the general policies of the
Guidelines in Poland (Initial Assessment) National Contact Point of Poland (16 May 2014).
Third Revised Draft (n 6) art 7.2.
ibid.
Lauge Koch (n 39).
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specific instance also demonstrates the NCP’s competence (in this case, basing
it on the Danish NCP Act) “to investigate cases on its own instigation”.44
3.4
Counsel
One of the important features of the NCP relates to the absence and presence
of counsel. First, counsel is neither compulsory nor necessary to participate in
the NCP process. The only requirement to undergo the NCP process is that the
complainant must be an interested party.45 Someone who is acting on behalf of
a victim may also file the complaint.46 To assist the person or entity initiating
the specific instance in the filing of their complaint, a template is also already
provided by the NCP.47 The mediation process is at no cost to the parties48 and
counsel remains not to be compulsory over the course of the mediation.
Second, despite the non-compulsory nature of counsel in the mediation
process, some NCPs recognise that there might be occasions when the assistance of counsel is necessary and appropriate. In these cases, as determined
by the NCP, counsel can be provided to the requesting party at the NCP’s cost.
For example, the Danish NCP provides counsel to the relevant party “if it is
not possible to handle their interests in a sufficient manner” and the services
are paid for by the NCP.49 Not requiring the assistance of counsel to launch a
complaint with an NCP removes a significant barrier to access to remedy: cost.
Likewise, NCPs that recognise the necessity of being assisted by counsel on
a case-by-case basis, and shouldering the cost of such services, augment the
removal of such barrier. Standardising the provision of counsel without charge
to victims based on certain decided criteria and on the assessment of the NCP
44		
45		

46		
47		

48		
49		

ibid [2].
OECD Guidelines (n 4) pp. 82–83; UK National Contact Point and Department for International Trade, ‘UK National Contact Point Procedures for Dealing with Complaints Brought
Under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (GOV.UK, September 2019) 5
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/851589/uk-ncp-specific-instance-procedures.pdf> accessed 15 April 2021
(UK NCP Complaint Procedures).
UK NCP Complaint Procedures (n 45) p. 5.
See eg The Austrian National Contact Point, ‘English Template for Submitting a Specific
Instance to the Austrian NCP’ (Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs)
<https://www.bmdw.gv.at/en/Topics/International/OECD-Guidelines-for-Multinational
-Enterprises-and-the-Austrian-NCP.html> accessed 15 April 2021.
See eg UK National Contact Point and Department for International Trade, ‘UK NCP
complaint handling process’ (GOV.UK, 7 January 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
uk-ncp-complaint-handling-process> accessed 15 April 2021.
Danish NCP, ‘Complaints Handling: If you need a counselor’ <https://businessconduct
.dk/if_you_need_a_counselor> accessed 15 April 2021 (note that the ‘counsellor’ may not
necessarily be a lawyer).
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will further strengthen the NCP’s commitment to access to remedy. This also
strengthens the UNGP’s third pillar and the Third Revised Draft’s proposition
for states parties to “provide adequate and effective legal assistance to victims
throughout the legal process”.50 The absence and presence of counsel, as discussed above, also supports the proposition by advocates to make the NCP process more accessible to victims.51
3.5
Findings and Recommendations Regardless of a Party’s Participation
NCPs are able to make its findings and issue recommendations despite a TNC’s
refusal to participate or dropping out of the proceedings. This is provided in
paragraph I(C)(3)(c) of the Procedural Guidance.52 It provides that despite
the parties having reached no agreement, or where a party is unwilling to participate in the proceedings, whether this be from the outset or midway into
the process, the NCP handling the specific instance is nevertheless required
to issue a statement, which must include, inter alia, “recommendations on
the implementation of the Guidelines as appropriate”.53 NCPs have used this
requirement to make their own findings of fact and of non-compliance by
corporations with the OECD Guidelines, and to issue recommendations in
situations where (1) the parties accepted the NCP’s offer of good offices but
no agreement was reached,54 (2) the TNC initially agreed to participate in the
proceedings but refused to do so at some point,55 and (3) the TNC refused to
participate in the proceedings at the outset.56 Unlike some of the flexibilities discussed here, this feature appears to be more widely undertaken by the
NCPs. Although, some NCPs (or final statements, if not by an NCP consistently)
appear to be stronger in their wording that a violation indeed occurred and
that certain changes in the form of recommendations need to be undertaken
by the TNC concerned. It must be noted, however, that the requirement under
paragraph I(C)(3)(c) merely pertains to the issuance of a statement, which
may not necessarily include a finding of compliance (or non-compliance) on
50		
51		
52		
53		
54		
55		
56		

Third Revised Draft (n 6) art 7.3.
See eg OECD Watch, Effective NCPs now! Remedy is the reason, para 4.
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I(C)(3)(c); OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 73.
OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 73 (emphasis omitted).
See eg Imperial Metals Corporation and Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (Final
Statement) National Contact Point of Canada (8 May 2020).
See eg Specific instance submitted by Australian Women Without Borders against Mercer PR
for its conduct in relation to activity in Nauru (Final Statement) National Contact Point of
Australia (9 July 2019).
See eg Obelle Concern Citizens (OCC) v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
Limited (SPDC) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) (Final Statement) National Contact Point of
the Netherlands (27 February 2020).
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the part of the business concerned. Prior research has already found that if
the decision-making body in a mediation process were to issue a finding of
compliance (or non-compliance), businesses are likely persuaded to attempt
to resolve the dispute at that stage.57 Accordingly, requiring NCPs to make such
finding when the parties fail to reach an agreement, or where a party is unwilling to participate in the mediation, will better achieve the goal of providing an
effective remedy to victims.58
The NCP’s ability to make its own findings and issue recommendations
despite the non-participation by a party, coupled with its ability to make an
independent investigation, is an important tool for accountability as the findings, conclusions and recommendations are generated by a state-based nonjudicial mechanism that is not only mandated but authorised by international
law and the adhering country to do so. These findings could then be used in
subsequent legal proceedings or in pressuring the TNC to act in accordance
with the OECD Guidelines. With respect to the potential BHR treaty, the
express requirement of providing state-based non-judicial mechanisms with
the ‘necessary competence’ “to enable victims’ access to adequate, timely and
effective remedy and access to justice” as reflected in the Third Revised Draft,
further empowers such mechanisms.59
3.6
Follow-Up Enquiry
The Commentary provides that NCPs may follow up with the parties on the
recommendations they have set out in the final statement whenever they
deem appropriate.60 This is in addition to when a follow-up was expressly
agreed upon by the parties.61 The follow-up process is intended to ensure that
the parties are complying or have complied with the terms of their agreement, or with the recommendations provided by the NCP. This has been done
in many occasions by various NCPs.62 However, not all of the NCPs (a) have
undertaken a follow-up, (b) have the practice of undertaking a follow-up
57		
58		
59		
60		
61		
62		

OECD Watch (n 51) para 6.
ibid.
Third Revised Draft (n 6) art 7.1.
OECD Guidelines (n 4) pp. 84–85.
ibid.
See eg Case involving Grupa OLX Sp. z o.o. (Follow-up Statement) National Contact
Point of Poland (28 July 2020); Complaint submitted by Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive
Development International on behalf of Cambodian families (Follow-up Statement)
National Contact Point of Australia (27 February 2020); Specific instance notified by Clean
Clothes Campaign Denmark and Active Consumers regarding the activities of PWT Group
(Follow-up Statement) National Contact Point of Denmark (17 January 2018); Complaint
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whenever, or as often as, it is appropriate, or (c) provide further guidance on
when or how to follow up through their own rules of procedure.63 Moreover,
there have been occasions when the follow-up is nevertheless unable to
resolve a conflict. In Survival International against Vedanta Resources plc,
the follow-up statement only noted the parties’ disagreement as to whether
Vedanta had complied with the UK NCP’s recommendations by stating the
parties’ versions of the facts.64 While a follow-up may be helpful in monitoring a TNC’s compliance with the NCP’s recommendations, it does not address
a situation where the TNC is found not to have complied with the NCP’s recommendations, or when the parties disagree about whether there was compliance. A follow-up could create an opportunity for the NCP to undertake
further fact-finding to ascertain which allegations are true. Further guidance
on follow-up enquiries which was published by the OECD in 2019, could prove
insightful.65 As the OECD itself noted, some NCPs find the follow-up process
to be instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of the OECD Guidelines.66
And the OECD further acknowledged that “soft norms or recommendations
which are not followed up on or not accompanied by a credible verification
mechanism will be less effective and will not likely lead to accountability for
non-compliance”.67 It would accordingly be ideal to revisit the follow-up process and consider further strengthening the same to improve the NCP’s effectiveness. This would mean requiring NCPs to follow up on specific instances,
to ensure for example, that the mediation agreement between the parties has
been duly complied with,68 rather than retaining the current optional practice.69 This could also include adopting a more uniform follow-up rules of procedure across NCPs. Finally, depending on any potential additional mechanism
that the OEIGWG decides to include in the potential BHR treaty, introducing
(or at least recommending) a follow-up or verification process could enhance
access to remedy.

63		
64		
65		
66		
67		
68		
69		

from Survival International against Vedanta Resources plc (Follow-up Statement) National
Contact Point of the United Kingdom (12 March 2010).
OECD, Guide for National Contact Points on Follow Up to Specific Instances (OECD 2019)
pp. 6–9 and 13–14 (Follow Up Guidance).
Survival International (n 62) [11]–[21].
Follow Up Guidance (n 63).
ibid, p. 5.
ibid.
OECD Watch (n 51) para 8.
Follow Up Guidance (n 63) p. 20.
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3.7
Conditions for Future Support
Governments can likewise be creative in encouraging their TNCs to commit
to human rights principles and standards. The Canadian Government stands
out in this regard. In China Gold International Resources, the Canadian NCP
was confronted with allegations of human rights and environmental violations committed by China Gold, a Canadian TNC, with respect to its mining
activities at the Gyama Valley in Tibet.70 In that specific instance, China Gold
refused to respond to the NCP’s offer of good offices. In the meantime, Canada
launched an enhanced CSR strategy called ‘Doing Business the Canadian Way:
A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive
Sector Abroad’.71 This initiative was introduced to encourage TNCs in the
extractive industry to engage in responsible business activities by providing
certain incentives. Conversely, it imposes sanctions on TNCs that are unwilling
to participate in ‘dialogue facilitation processes’ (such as the NCP).72 Canadian
TNCs that refuse to participate in dialogue facilitation processes become disqualified from Trade Commissioner Service and advocacy support abroad,
and the Government’s ‘economic diplomacy’ support is likewise withdrawn.73
While China Gold was not persuaded to participate in the NCP proceedings
despite a subsequent second invitation, this enabled the Government, as noted
by the Canadian NCP, to impose sanctions by disqualifying China Gold from
the aforementioned benefits in the future. Following Canada’s example, adhering countries may also impose similar initiatives to their TNCs which could
encourage many (if not all) to participate in alternative modes of dispute resolution. Other similar consequences include “exclusion from privileges such as
public procurement contracts, export credit guarantees, private sector development aid [and] international trade”.74
3.8
Parallel Legal Proceedings
Paragraph 26 of the Commentary provides that as a general rule, the proceedings before the NCP must not be suspended solely on account of a parallel

70		

71		
72		
73		
74		

Operations of China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd., at the Copper Polymetallic
Mine at the Gyama Valley, Tibet Autonomous Region (Final Statement) National Contact
Point of Canada (8 April 2015); OECD, ‘Gold mining in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region’
(Canadian NCP, 28 January 2014) <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/
ca0012.htm> accessed 22 March 2021.
China Gold (n 70) annex 4.
ibid.
ibid.
OECD Watch (n 51) para 3.
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legal proceeding.75 NCPs are invited to evaluate first “whether an offer of good
offices could make a positive contribution to the resolution of the issues raised
and would not create prejudice for either the parties involved in these other
proceedings or cause a contempt of court situation”.76 This was emphasised
in Flavia Di Cino & Tenaris S.A. In that specific instance, Mrs Di Cino withdrew
her complaint with the Argentinian NCP as she pursued judicial recourse.77
The Argentine NCP respected her decision but advised her that the NCP may
nevertheless “give admissibility to some points of the presentation, or, if she
preferred, according to the evolution of the proceedings in legal courts”.78
It appears that there are many cases where the NCP suspended or concluded the proceedings on account of a parallel legal proceeding, usually in
domestic courts. In fact, it appears that Flavia Di Cino is the exception despite
the wording of paragraph 26 of the Commentary. This may pose a challenge in
changing the mindset of the NCPs as to how cases may be handled notwithstanding parallel proceedings. Furthermore, domestic courts and their rules of
procedure might actually create a legal constraint on an NCP to continue offering its good offices to the parties as well as impose sanctions on the party still
pursuing NCP proceedings. It might be an opportune time for the Investment
Committee, in consultation with NCPs and in coordination with judicial bodies of adhering countries, to further discuss how to operationalise paragraph
26 of the Commentary in a manner that is legally permissible. In relation to the
potential BHR treaty, the drafters could study how parallel proceedings could
properly operate and whether changes in existing judicial rules of procedure
might be necessary to expressly accommodate this feature.
4

Cooperation between and among NCPs

The NCP system is distinct from judicial and other state-based mechanisms for
another reason. NCPs are obligated to coordinate and cooperate with each other
in order to make the interpretation and application of standards, principles,
rules and procedures consistent, uniform and predicable. Paragraphs I(2) and
75		
76		
77		
78		

OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 83.
ibid.
Tenaris S.A. & Flavia Di Cino (Declaración Final) National Contact Point of Argentina
(May 2019).
OECD, ‘Tenaris S.A. and Flavia Di Cino’ (Argentinian NCP, 25 September 2017) <http://
mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/instances/ar0012.htm> accessed 26 February 2021;
Tenaris S.A. & Flavia Di Cino (Declaración Final) National Contact Point of Argentina
(May 2019).
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(3) of the Decision of the OECD Council, which forms part of the Guidelines’
Implementation Procedures, provide that:
2. National Contact Points in different countries shall co-operate if such
need arises, on any matter related to the Guidelines relevant to their
activities. As a general procedure, discussions at the national level should
be initiated before contacts with other National Contact Points are
undertaken.
3. National Contact Points shall meet regularly to share experiences and
report to the Investment Committee.79
Further provisions of the Decision of the OECD Council also require NCPs to
consult or coordinate with other NCPs as necessary and appropriate, as well
as with non-adhering countries when the alleged violations occurred in that
state.80 NCPs are likewise mandated to respond to other NCPs which may have
enquiries relevant to the OECD Guidelines.81 There have been many occasions when the NCPs have cooperated and coordinated amongst themselves
in resolving specific instances.82 And in relation to paragraph I(3) above, the
NCPs meet bi-annually at the OECD Headquarters83 and are given the opportunity to undergo the peer review process.84 This gives them the opportunity to
share their own experiences as well as learn the best practices and inner workings of the other NCPs.85 These undertakings enable them to “discuss ways in
which the NCP mechanism can be strengthened”.86
79		
80		
81		
82		

83		
84		
85		
86		

Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I(2)–(3).
ibid, annex paras I(B)(3)(a) and I(C)(2)(b); OECD Guidelines (n 4) pp. 72, 77, 82 and 86.
Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I(B)(3)(a); OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 72.
See eg Complaint submitted by four former employees and union representatives of a Congolese company against the Congolese company, its Luxembourg holding company and
a German company (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Germany (16 December 2019); Specific Instance regarding Pharmakina SA and Pharmeg SA submitted by
former employees of Pharmakina SA (Final Statement) National Contact Point of Switzerland (22 January 2020); Specific instance submitted by four former workers against their
employer, PHARMAKINA SA, established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
PHARMEG SA, incorporated in Luxembourg (Initial Assessment) National Contact Point
of Luxembourg (21 November 2019).
OECD FAQs (n 17).
OECD, ‘National Contact Point peer reviews’ <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncppeer
reviews.htm> accessed 15 April 2021 (NCP Peer Reviews).
OECD FAQs (n 17).
ibid.
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The cooperation and coordination amongst NCPs serve as a way to maintain
predictability, consistency and uniformity in the (a) interpretation and application of the OECD Guidelines and (b) proceedings across NCPs. Unfortunately,
the various flexibilities earlier presented create challenges as they offer opportunities. For example, the inconsistencies in the manner by which NCPs
have resolved disputes, or the varying levels in which they use the flexibilities meant that victims are unable to depend on their consistency and predictability, which are expected in the implementation of specific instances.87
This weakness ultimately adversely impacts the mechanism’s effectiveness.
Strengthening vertical and horizontal collaborations,88 and re-calibrating the
system in light of the opportunities offered by the flexibilities, could address
the challenges surrounding the NCP.
5

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that NCPs are capable of using certain features
of the mechanism and the flexibilities afforded to them by the Implementation
Procedures of the OECD Guidelines to strengthen corporate accountability and
improve access to remedy. And this deserves to be highlighted and discussed
not only to enhance the NCP as a mechanism, but also to serve as an additional
blueprint for the two UN pathways on corporate accountability that are being
advanced in recent years. Indeed, flexibilities are ideal when the mechanism
is newly introduced, or even when what is being introduced is considered to
be novel in the field, such as when the NCP was introduced. However, as the
field matures and progresses, it is important that certain flexibilities give way
to further uniformity and coherence in (1) the standards and principles used
(hence, a need for a legally binding instrument), and (2) the mechanism being
utilised or established. This accordingly entails a policy shift from the currently
enjoyed flexibilities to ensuring functional equivalence amongst NCPs89 and in
future mechanisms. This will also reinforce the much-needed accountability
not only on the part of the TNCs but also on the part of states.
It would be appropriate to reiterate that this article does not attempt to
exempt the OECD Guidelines and the NCPs from their shortfalls. Nor will this
87		
88		
89		

Decision of the OECD Council (n 8) annex para I(C); OECD Guidelines (n 4) p. 72.
See eg NCP Peer Reviews (n 84) (that “at the June 2017 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting
(MCM), governments committed … ‘to undertake a peer learning, capacity building exercise or a peer review by 2021, with a view to having all countries peer reviewed by 2023’”).
OECD Watch (n 51) para 9.
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article state that the NCP process, when enhanced, can solve the issue of effective remedy in the field of BHR. Rather, it seeks to present certain features that
are unique to the mechanism, and reveal how certain flexibilities have aided
NCPs in further strengthening corporate accountability despite implementing
a non-binding guideline. This is being done to enable policymakers to consider
certain aspects of existing mechanisms – such as NCP system – (1) that may
have worked, or (2) which with further enhancement, could improve the effectiveness not only of such mechanism but also of a potential future mechanism.
Doing so will hopefully elevate the discussion further with respect to the UNGP
and the potential BHR treaty.
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